Weaponizing State Hierarchy: The Enforcement of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Implication on the Principle of Sovereign Equality among UN Member States

Abstract

Nuclear weapons are subject to some of the most stringent international regulations, and the United Nations (UN) is central to the successful regulation of these potentially destructive weapons. Under its auspices, the 1967 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) was negotiated, and it remains the primary nuclear regulatory agreement in operation. A major criticism levelled against the NPT is that it creates a system within which a few states enjoy more favourable positions than the majority, and such a system is contrary to the principle of sovereign equality championed by the UN. In this dissertation, the patterns of enforcement of the NPT are considered in an effort to interrogate these criticisms. To ensure that the considerations are robust, the origins and provisions of the NPT are explored, and its available enforcement mechanisms are identified and examined in the process. Case studies are also undertaken to gauge the level of enforcement or non-enforcement against particular states. The findings show that five state parties are able to violate the provisions of the NPT and face no consequences while the remaining parties are held to strict standards of compliance. This work concludes with recommendations for a fairer system of enforcement in hopes that the principles of sovereign equality will be respected in future attempts at nuclear enforcement.